Guinness Global Innovators Fund

The investment process begins by identifying innovative companies. We assess all sectors to identify themes that are driving growth, disrupting incumbent business models or technology, or significantly improving current products or services. We also utilise third party research to further broaden our understanding and identify around 10 themes which are updated annually. We then identify companies with exposure to these secular growth themes and a market capitalisation greater than $1bn.

Not every innovative company is a good investment, and we screen for (i) return on capital greater than cost of capital last year (ii) debt/equity < 150%, and (iii) positive earnings growth expected next year. Recognising that hype can surround innovative companies, we maintain a value discipline as we generate ideas using further screening. We then subject stock ideas to a thorough due diligence process and assemble a portfolio of 30 positions with an equal-weight approach.
 

The investment process begins by identifying innovative companies. We assess all sectors to identify trends and themes that are driving growth, disrupting incumbent business models or technology, or significantly improving current products or services. We utilise third party research and analysis to further broaden our understanding of the secular growth trends in the market. Typically, we identify 10-15 themes at any one time and update them annually. We then identify companies with exposure to these secular growth themes which have a market capitalisation greater than $0.5bn.
 

With the initial universe of innovative companies created we then employ a quality screen to select only those businesses that are “good companies”. We only want to invest in profitable companies, with strong balance sheets, that have good growth prospects and emphasise that our process is intended to find not just innovative companies, but good quality innovative companies. The simple quality criteria screened for are (i) return on capital greater than cost of capital last year (ii) debt/equity < 150%, and (iii) positive earnings growth expected next year. The companies left after the quality screen make up the investible investment universe for the fund and typically have better than average financial metrics showing faster profit growth, larger profit margins, and less susceptibility to cyclical pressures.
 

From this universe of good quality, innovative companies, we then seek to identify which of them are undervalued. We screen all these innovative companies to identify which are the most attractive in terms of valuation, return on investment, earnings sentiment, and price momentum. By ranking companies using these four criteria, we can sift through the data to prioritise candidates for extended due diligence, testing and research. Having identified candidates for further due diligence, we subject all potential investments to detailed fundamental analysis. Above all, we want to understand what competitive advantages or barriers to entry are sustaining a company’s return on investment to determine whether the returns will persist. We also recognise that sentiment and hype can sometimes drive up the valuations of innovative companies and so we try to maintain a strict value discipline. We want to avoid paying up for high levels of expected growth in the future as we know, on average, very high growth expectations are often not met, and this can have a detrimental effect on a company’s valuation. We therefore look for companies offering good value relative to their sector, to their historic valuations, or in absolute terms.
 

It is often easier to find companies to buy that look cheap than it is to identify those companies you own which should be sold. We consider sell discipline as important as selecting companies for purchase and continuously monitor the companies we hold in the Fund. The six core reasons we may sell a company are outlined below.

1. The company no longer qualifies as innovative
2. Their balance sheet becomes stretched
3. The valuation becomes too rich, or no longer offers compelling upside
4. There is a change in a company’s capital budgeting approach
5. Our original investment thesis no longer holds
6. We find a more compelling investment idea